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by Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. 
"The monad of which we shall speak here is nothing but a simple substance 
which enters into compounds; simple, that is to  say, without parts. 
And there must be simple substances, because there are compounds, for 
the compound is nothing but a collection or an aggregatum of simples." 
(Monadologj~, secs. I and 2; MP, 179)' 
These opening paragraphs of The Monadolog~y present an important 
doctrine in Leibniz's metaphysics, namely, the doctrine that all substances are 
simple, i.e., without parts; or, if we are inclined to  suppose that Leibniz 
admitted compound substances, that every substance either lacks parts or is 
composed of substances that lack parts. Let us call this doctrine the simplicity 
of substance. The main aim of this paper is to discuss one line of reasoning 
that apparently led Leibniz t o  the doctrine of the simplicity of substance. It  is 
a line of reasoning which is to  be found in the Discourse on Metaphysics and 
the correspondence concerning the Discourse with Arnauld. The line of 
reasoning I have in mind is that summarized in the following quotation from 
Leibniz's letter to  Arnauld in December of 1686: "Substantial unity requires a 
complete, indivisible, and naturally indestructible entity, since its concept 
embraces everything that is to happen t o  it . . ." (G/2/76; Mason 94). This 
quotation might suggest that one line of reasoning that Ied Leibniz to the 
simplicity of substance is the same as what led him to  the "notable paradoxes" 
of paragraph 9 of the Discourse on Metaphysics. Recall Leibniz's words: 
From this, several notable paradoxes follow. One of these is that ~t is not true that two 
substances resemble each other entlrely and are different in number alone (solo rzumero), 
. . and that a substance can begin only by creation and perish only by ann~hilation; that 
one substance is not divided into two nor IS one made out of two. . . . (DM, sec. 9; MP, 19) 
Note that the notable paradoxes cited d o  not include the simplicity of 
substance. Still, I agree with Parkinson when he claims, while discussing some 
of the notable paradoxes, "the indivisibility of substance, then, is the primary 
consequence from which the others are d e r i ~ e d . " ~  All we need do, one might 
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think, is to  reconstruct the general line of reasoning by which Leibnizarrived 
at the notable paradoxes fashioning whatever peculiarities are called for in 
the case of the simplicity of substance. Naturally we want to  know the reference 
of the 'this' in "From this, several notable paradoxes follow . . .". Not sur- 
prisingly, the most likely candidates are to be found in paragraph 8 of the 
Discourse. Paragraph 8 coupled with our  quotation from Leibniz's letter to  
Arnauld of December 1686 suggests the following argument: 
A 
(i) for any x, x is an  individual substance if and only if the concept 
c of x is complete relative t o  x. 
(ii) for any x, if the concept c o f x i s  complete relative to  x thenx  is not 
composite. 
-'.(iii) for any x,  if x is an  individual substance then x i s  not composite. 
I take A(ii) to be implied by our quotation from the letter of December 1686. 
Note that for A t o  be valid we need only the"on1y ir 'part of A(i). And actually 
the crucial lines from paragraph 8 may be construed as supporting no more 
than the "only if" part of A(i). The lines I have in mind are these: 
That be~ngso,  we cansay that it is the nature of a n  indiv~dual substance, or complete being, 
to have a notion so  complete that ~t is sufficient to contain, and render deducible from 
itself, all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed. (DM, sec. 8; MP, 18) 
This quotation seems to  say that the property of having its concept a 
complete one is essential to  an  individual substance. But of course that is 
consistent with non-substances having the property (either essentially or 
accidentally). Still I agree (again) with Parkinson that Leibniz did hold the 
"ifWpart of A(i), i.e., that if the concept of an  entity is complete then that entity 
is an individual substance.' In a fragment written in 1686 we find: 
If a notion 1s complete, 1.e.. IS such that from it a reason can be given for all the predicates 
of the subject to which thisnotion can be attributed, this will be the notion ofan ind~v~dual  
substance; and conversely (C. 403; MP, 95; cf. G/2/68;  Mason 84) 
Even though argument A does not require the "if" part of A(i), my belief is 
that understanding why Leibniz held the "if" part of A(i) may shed some light 
on why he held A(ii). Hence, in Part I, I discuss A(i)-both the "only if" part 
which the argument requires and the "if" part that the argument does not 
require. In Part 11, I organize some material treated haphazardly in Part  I. In 
Part 111, I discuss A($. 
I 
'That being so  . . .' commences our quotation from paragraph 8 of the 
Discourse. What being so? On  the most liberal interpretation there are two 
candidates: one, what I shall call the Aristotelian Conception of Subsfance, 
which is expressed in paragraph 8 as follows: 
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when several predicates are attributed LO one and the same subject, and this subject 1s not 
attributed to any other, one calls this subject an ind~vidual substance. (DM, sec. 8; M P  18); 
the other, what I shall call the Concept Containment Account of Truth, which 
is expressed in paragraph 8 as follows: 
every true predication has some baas in the nature of things, and when a proposltlon is not 
identical-that IS, when the predtcate is not conta~ned expressIy in the subject-~t must be 
contamed in it virtually. (DM,  sec. 8; M P  18) 
I shall take this passage t o  express the same account of truth as the following 
passage taken from a July 1686 letter to  Arnauld: 
In every true affirmative proposition, necessary o r  contingent, un~versaf or singular, the 
concept of the pred~cate 1s contained In some manner In that of the subject,praeclrc.artim 
rneFi suhlecro. Or else I d o  not know what truth IS (G /2 /56 ;  Mason, 63) 
Without aiming for subtlety we might formulate the concept containment 
account of truth as applied to categorical, affirmatwe, singular propositions 
in the following manner: 
Df 1 For any categorical affirmative singular proposition p, p is true 
if and only if there are entities x, y, c, and c' such that: 
i) x is the subject of p 
and ii) y is the predicate of p 
and iii) c is the concept of x 
and iv) c' is the concept of y 
and v) c' is contained in c. 
Let C#J be a sentence that expresses a categorical affirmative singular propo- 
s i t i o n ~ .  It seems clear that Leibniz made the followingassumptions: C#J may be 
analyzed into a grammatical subject and a grammatical predicate; p has two 
primary constituents corresponding respectively to  the grammatical subject 
and the grammatical predicate of 4. One primary constituent is the subject 
concept o f p  which is a concept of that to  which the grammatical subject of 4 
refers, i.e., the subject of p. The other primary constituent is the predicate 
concept of p which is a concept of that for which the grammatical predicate of 
C#J stands, i.e., the predicate ofp .  Where x is an  individual substance, obviously 
x can occur as the reference of a grammatical subject. Moreover, given the 
Aristotelian conception of substance, x never occurs as the predicate of a 
proposition, only as the subject. Let us assume for now that we are to associate 
with a given entity a unique concept (at least for the purpose of deciding what 
concept will occur as a primary constituent in a proposition about that 
entity).4 Then, Df 1 requires that if x is an  individuaI substance then the 
concept c associated with x (i.e., the concept of x) contains (in some manner) a 
concept of every propertyx has; and, hence, that c is complete relative t o x i n  
the sense of containing a concept of every property x has. Of course we would 
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like to know what prompted Leibniz t o  offer the account of truth that Df 1 
purports to capture for the case of categorical, affirmative, singular proposi- 
tions. But that is a topic for another paper. 
Note that our derivation of the "only if" part of A(i) depends upon assuming 
the following principle: 
P1 For any entity x, there is a unique concept c such that c is a primary 
constituent in any propositionp of which x is either the subject or the 
predicate. 
Is it reasonable to attribute such an assumption to Leibniz?I think it is. In the 
correspondence we find Arnauld defending a rule for determining the concept 
of x, for any entity x . ~  Arnauld drew certain conclusions about what proposi- 
tions are true, what false, what necessary, what contingent on the basis of the 
assignment of concepts t o  entities that results from the application of his rule. 
The reply Leibniz sent to Arnauld on these matters is to be found from 
G/2/49-GI2153 (Mason, 54-59). Arnauld's rule is subjected t o  criticism and a 
different assignment of concepts to  entities is defended. None of this debate 
makes sense unless PI is accepted by both Arnauld and Leibniz. 
S o  much for the "only i f '  part of A(i). Assuming PI ,  we may formulate the 
"if" part as follows: 
P2 For any entity x, if the concept of x is complete relative to x, then x is 
an individual substance. 
Consider the following, quite different principle: 
P3 For any entity x, if there is a concept c such that: 
i) c i s  of x 
and ii) c is complete relative to  x 
then x is an individual substance. 
Let us not worry about the possibility of divergent readings of 'of x' and 
'complete relative to x' as they occur in P2 and P3. In a letter to  Hessen- 
Rheinfels, complaining of Arnauld's truculence, we find Leibniz saying: 
Can one deny that everything (whether genus, specles, o r  ind~vidual) has a complete 
concept [utre tzorron accon~plre] , . . that is to say a concept which contalns or Includes 
everyth~ng that can be s a ~ d  of the thing (GI21 131, Mason, 73) 
The answer Leibniz expected is: no-one can't deny it; but a genus or a species 
is not a n  individual substance-so much the worse for P3. S o  according to 
Leibniz there is a concept of a genus, or, indeed, any abstraction which is 
complete relative to that thing (at least in the sense of containing [a concept 
ofl everything that can be said [truly] of that thing). And of course there is. 
Apparently Leibniz wanted to hold that in the case of a non-substancexsuch 
a concept is not the concept of x-not a primary constituent in propositions 
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of which x is the subject or predicate. Indeed, if we turn back to  paragraph 8 
of the Discourse we find a passage that suggests that the concept of an ab- 
straction x (as, for example, a genus, a species, o r  an  accident) is not even "of" 
x in the sense of containing concepts of properties of x. So  it does not have a 
chance of being complete relative to  x in the sense of containing concepts of 
everything that can be said truly of x. Consider this passage: 
an accldent 1s a being whose notiondoes not include all that can be attr~buted to the subject 
to which this notlon is attributed. Take, for exampIe, the quality of b e ~ n g  a King, whlch 
belongs to Alexander the Great. This quality, when abstracted from the subject, 1s not 
sufficlent1y determinate for an ind~vldual and does not contam the other qualities of the 
same subject, nor everything that the notion of this prince contalns. (DM, sec. 8; MP,  19) 
This passage makes it clear that concepts contained in the concept of the 
quality of being a king are concepts of properties had by kings, not concepts 
of properties had by the quality of being a king. Numerous other passages 
support the thesis that for Leibniz the concept of an  abstraction contains 
concepts of properties of the things from which it is abstracted, not concepts 
of properties of the abstraction itself. 
But does this not generate a problem for Leibniz? He was well aware that 
accidents have accidents; more generally, that abstractions have properties.6 
Think, then, of a categorical affirmative singular proposition p which 
attributes a property F to an  abstraction B. P1 and Df 1 applied to  such a 
propositiotl require that the concept of B be complete relative t o  Bin the sense 
of containing (a concept of) everything that can be said truly of B. But we have 
just seen that in no case did Leibniz regard the concept of an  abstraction as 
being complete in this sense. Is there a resolution t o  this difficulty? I think 
there is. Here is my picture of Leibniz's picture of the matter: 
Assume a somewhat simplistic correlation between grammatical subjects 
(predicates) of sentences and subject (predicate) concepts of propositions 
expressed by  sentence^.^ Let 4 be any categorical affirmative singular sentence 
in subject-predicate form; let x be the concept of that to which the grammatical 
subject of 4 refers; let 1) be the concept of that for which the predicate concept 
of 4 stands. It will not cause us difficulties in understanding Leibniz if we 
suppose that he identified the proposition expressed by 4 with the ordered 
pair a = <x,$. More generally, for any categorical, affirmative singular 
proposition p we may suppose that Leibniz identified p with an ordered pair 
whose first term is the subject concept of p and whose second term is the 
predicate concept of p. (Of course there are difficulties in so construing 
propositions, e.g., we cannot say that if sentences 4 and I,!J express the same 
proposition then they have the same meaning). 
Now there is considerable evidence that Leibniz thought it useful to "do 
without abstract terms in a rational language" (C, 243; LLP, 12). And there is 
considerable evidence that he thought this goal attainable, e.g., "it is not easy 
to d o  without abstract nouns. Therefore, it suffices to prescribe this that they 
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be avoided as far  as it is possible. However, I hold it for certain that when the 
correct characteristic has been established it will be possible to avoid them 
entirely" (C, 435: cf, C, 512-513; M P  6-7). 
Let us introduce the technical term "official proposition" to denote a 
singular proposition expressed by some singular sentence in "a rational 
language," in "the correct characteristic." My suggestion is, then, that Leibniz 
held that categorical affirmative singular sentences whose grammatical 
subjects refer to abstractions are eliminable in the sense that they are equiva- 
lent in meaning t o  sentences which, if categorical, affirmative, and singular, 
lack grammatical subjects referring to abstractions. In a rational language no 
categorical affirmative singular sentences with grammatical subjects referring 
to  abstractions would occur. Hence, where x is the concept of an abstraction 
and y any concept whatever, <x,j> is not an official proposition. I suggest that 
Leibniz intended to apply the concept containment account of truth only to 
official propositions. 
I am aware that the evidence for this claim is less than overwhelming. My 
own confidence in the correctness of this interpretation is based in part on this 
indirect evidence: alternative accounts seem to me either to stray far from the 
texts or  to attribute to Leibniz theses which are so exceedingly implausible 
that I cannot believe he would have accepted them. 
P2, then, turns out to be something Leibniz can support because the concept 
containment account of truth is simply not applied to  categorical affirmative 
singular propositions whose subjects are non-substances. Given that the 
concept of x i s  to be whatever concept is a primary constituent of all official 
propositions in which x figures as either subject or  predicate, it is clear that 
Df 1 does not require the assignment of a complete concept t o  an abstraction. 
Thin ice, you may say, and you may be right. Now what has this t o  d o  with 
Leibniz's acceptance of A(ii)? My suggestion is that the project of translating 
out definite singular terms referring to abstractions was extended by Leibniz 
t o  the replacement (via analysis, of course) of some definite singular terms 
that would pre-analytically be taken to refer to  non-abstractions, i.e., 
concrete entities. At first Leibniz applied the translation project to (definite 
singular terms referring to) "moral entities," e.g., entities such as an army, a 
college, the Dutch East Indies Company-where, as he put it, "something 
imaginary exists, dependent on  the fabrication of our minds" (G/2/76; 
Mason 94). Leibniz treated these "moral entities" as logical  construction^.^ 
In the preceding discussion the idea that a concept is of a thing x and the 
idea that a concept is complete relative t o  a th ingx have both been employed 
in various ways. I t  may prove useful to  organize this material somewhat more 
carefully. It is natural to suppose that 'relative to x'in 'complete relative to x' 
ought to  mean the same as 'of x.' With this supposition in hand, then, we may 
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divide our task into 1) explaining completeness, and 2) explaining what it is 
for a concept t o  be of something. 
1) Some background: although Leibniz took concepts of properties to  be 
contained in concepts, we shall simplify and take properties themselves t o  be 
contained in concepts. Having gone this far, let us take a concept to  be a set 
whose members are the properties it contains. Let us say that a set of properties 
c entails a property Fjust  in case it is not possible that something has every 
member of c and yet lacks F. Let c and c' be non-empty sets of properties; let 
R be the set of properties entailed by c and R'the set of properties entailed by 
c'. Then 'c'is contained in c'(as it occurs in Df 1) will be true just incase R's 8.  
Consider these definitions: (assume that c ranges over non-empty sets of 
properties) 
Df 2 c is consistent=df. It is possible that there is some- 
thing that has every property in c. 
Df 3 c i s  maximal=df. For any property F, if c does not 
entaiI F then c U 1 F I is inconsistent. 
Df 4 c is complete=df. c is maximal and consistent 
Note that for any property F,  if c is maximal then either c entails F o r  c 
entails the complement of F. Moreover, if c is consistent then it will not entail 
both F and its complement. c may be complete even though there is some 
property F such that neither F nor its complement is a member of c. 
2) Given PI  and the remarks about how Arnauld and Leibniz understood 
'the concept of-' our hand is forced with respect to  explaining 'the concept 
of x.' It must come to this: 
Df 5 cis  the concept of x=df. c is a primary constituent 
in every official proposition of which x is either 
the subject or the predicate. 
This definition leaves something to  be desired. It may be said that it does not 
make clear, even in conjunction with Df 1, what the membership of c will be 
for given x. And it does not shed much light on how 'c is of x'is to be construed, 
It is natural to press on to a definition that is more forthcoming with respect 
to  the membership of c for given x. Consider: 
Df 6 c is of x=df. For  any property F, if F c c then x 
has F. 
Notice that Df 6 allows that an entity x may have more than one concept 
which is of it. Now consider: 
Df 7 c is complete relative t o  x=df. 
i) For any property F, if F c c then x has F 
and ii) c is complete. 
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Notice that this is possible: there is an  entity x and concepts cand c'such that 
c is complete relative t o  x and c' is complete relative to x and c f  e'. However, 
where c and c' are distinct but both complete relative to x, then, for any 
property F, c entails F if and only if c' entails F. 
My suggestion is that where we find Leibniz saying that "everything 
(whether genus, species, or  individual) has a complete concept" ( G / 2 /  131; 
Mason, 73) ,  'complete' is used in the sense of Df 7. 
But a s  previously noted, paragraph 8 of the Discourse suggests that  Df 6 
simply will not d o  whenapplied to non-substances. Can westand closer to the 
text and still provide a definition that is more forthcoming concerning the 
membership of c for given x? I think we can d o  somewhat better. Consider: 
Df 8 x is an  Aristotelian substance =df. 
x has properties but there is no  y such that x is a property 
of y.  
Df 9 c is of x =df. 
i) If x is a n  Aristotelian substance then, for any property 
F, F E c only if x has F. 
and ii) If x is not a n  Aristotelian substance then, for any 
property F, FE c only if, fo ranyy ,  ify has x then y has F. 
Df 10 c is complete relative to  x =df. 
i) c is complete 
and ii) If x is a n  Aristotelian substance then, for any property 
F, F E c only if x has F. 
and iii) If x is not a n  Aristotelian substance then, for any 
property F, F E c only if, fo r  any y ,  i fy has x then y has F. 
Consider this passage: 
A full concept contains all the predicates of the thing, e g., heat; a completeconcept all the 
pred~cates of the subject, e.g., a hot fire. They co~ncide ~n Individual substances. (GI21 131; 
Mason, 73) 
My suggestion is that in this passage by a full concept Leibniz meant a 
complete concept in the sense of Df 7 and by a complere concept he meant a 
complete concept in the sense of Df 10. He was pointing out (correctly) that 
if x is not a substance then x will not have a complete concept in the sense of 
Df 10 since a consistent concept of i t  (in the sense of Df 9) will not be maximal 
provided that there are substances p and z such that both y and z have x but, 
for some property F, y has F while z lacks F. 
Recall the quotation that sets the main puzzle with which this paper deals: 
"Substantial unity requires a complete, indivisible, and naturally indestructible 
entity, since its concept embraces everything that is t o  happen to it" (G /2 /76 ;  
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Mason, 94). Using 'complete relative to' in the sense of Df 10, can we capture 
part of the force of this as follows? 
(1) For any entity x,  if there is a concept csuch that ciscomplete 
relative to x then x is not composite. 
Not if the variable 'x'is allowed unrestricted range. The sense of completeness 
captured in Df 10 may well explicate the phrase 'complete notion'as it occurs 
in this passage from Leibniz's remarks on a letter from Arnauld: 
The n o t ~ o n  of thesphere wh~ch Archimedes had placed upon his tomb is a complete notion 
and is bound to include everything which belongs to the subject of that form. (G/2/39; 
MP. 53) 
But this sense of completeness is but a half-way house for Leibniz. It goes with 
the notion of an  Aristotelian substance as  usually construed since that notion 
is built into it. Clearly, the sphere on Archimedes' tomb is composite--it has 
spatial parts. If my interpretation is sound, in the final analysis the sphere on 
Archimedes' tomb turns up as a Iogical construction. Let us consider the 
final analysis. 
I take a s  my text for this section the following from Leibniz's letter t o  
Arnauld of April 30, 1687: 
it can therefore be said of these composite bodies and similar things what Democritus said 
very well about them, "they exist. by convention. . . ."Our mind notices or conceives of 
certain genuine substances which have various modes; these modes embrace relat~onships 
w ~ t h  other substances, from which the mind takes the opportunity to link them together~n 
thought and to enter into the account one name for all these things together, which makes 
for convenience In reasoning. But one must not let oneself be deceived and make of them 
so many substances. . ; that is only for those who stop at  appearances, or those who make 
realit~es out of all the abstract~ons of the mind, and who conceive of number, time, place, 
movement, shape. . asso many separateentit~es. Whereas I maintam that onecannot find 
&better way of restoring the prestlge of philosophy and transforming it into something 
preclse than by distinguishing the only substances or complete e n t ~ t ~ e s ,  endowed w ~ t h  true 
unity, . . . all the rest is merely phenomena, abstract~ons, or reIattonshlps.(G/2/ 101; 
Mason, 126-127) 
Consider the proposition expressed by the following sentence: 
(2) The place that the Polo Grounds occupied in 1950 is now 
occupied by a housing project. 
Let x be the concept of the place mentioned and y the concept of the property 
of being now occupied by a housing project. As I a m  now construing Leibniz, 
(x,y> is the proposition expressed by (2) but, nonetheless,<x,y)is not an  
official proposition. Presumably, Leibniz held that we can find some sentence 
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that has the same meaning as (2) which is either not singular, or, if singular, is 
such that its grammatical subject does not (purport to) refer to an abstraction 
(cf. the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, MP, 230-233). Another way to put 
the matter would be this: according to a natural interpretation of Leibniz, he 
held that places are logical constructions; our set of official propositions to 
which Df I is t o  be applied will exclude propositions expressed by singular 
sentences whose grammatical subjects refer to logical constructions. 
Pretend so far, so good. Let us concentrate on definite singular terms which 
purport to refer to entities which satisfy Df 8, i.e., which are Aristotelian 
substances, but which are composite. Obviously my thesis is that these terms 
are ones Leibniz wished to translate away; or, speaking in the material mode, 
the entities to which these terms purport to refer are ones Leibniz regarded as 
logical constructions. Leibniz thought that where human convention enters 
into the attribution of crucial properties to an entity, particularly where 
human convention enters into the identity conditions of entities of a given 
kind, there we have an entity of a kind ripe for one of two treatments: eschewal 
in cases where the relevant conventions lack a rational foundation; logical 
construction on a rational basis in cases where the relevant conventions have 
a rational basis (as in the case of phenomena bene fundata). 
One dividend of the view I am suggesting may be illustrated by a considera- 
tion of some of Leibniz's remarks about "true unities." Consider these passages: 
From A Specimen of Disroverres about Marvelozts Secrets o fa  General Nature (c. 1686): 
that is not one substance or one being which consists merely of anaggregation, such 
as a heap of stones, nor can beings be understood where there is no one true being 
(unurn Enr). (G/7/314; MP, 81) 
From The Lerhnrz-Arnauld Corresponcience (1687): 
I hold as axiomatic the identical proposition which varies only in emphas~s: that 
what is not truly one entity is not truly one entltv elther. (G/2/97, Mason, 121) 
From the Newb Sj7stern (1695): 
Now a multiplicity can be real only if it is made up of true unities (unitl.sveritables). 
(G/4/478; MP, 116) 
From the Monadology ( 17 14): 
there must be simple substances, because there are compounds, for thecompound is 
nothing but a collection or an aggregatum of simples. (Monadologv, sec. 2; MP, 179) 
It is natural to see in these passages a common doctrine-a doctrine dis- 
cussed by Thomas Reid and attributed by him to Leibniz: 
There IS, indeed, a principle long received as an axiom in metaphysics, which I cannot 
reconcile to the divisibility of matter; it is, that every being is one, omne ensesr unum. By 
whlch, I suppose, is meant that everything that exists must elther be one indivisible being, 
or composed of a determinate number of lndlvisible berngs. . 
That this axiom will hold with regard to a n  army, and with regard to many other thlngs, 
must be granted; but I require the ev~dence of its being applicable to all beings whatsoever. 
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Leibniz, conceiving that all beings must have this metaphyslcalunity, was by this led to 
maintain that matter, and, indeed, the whole universe, is made up of monads-that is, 
simple and indivisible substances 
The following definition will prove useful in discussing Reid's interpreta- 
tion of Leibniz. 
Df 11 D is a decomposition of x=df. 
i) D is a non-empty set such that, for any y, .y c: D only if y is 
a component of x. 
and ii) for any y and z,  ify E D  and z E D  and y #  z then there is no w 
such that: 
(a) w is a component of y 
and (b) w is a component of z 
and iii) for any z, if z is a component of x and z 4 D then there is a y 
such that: 
(a) Y D 
and (b) there is some w such that \Y is a component ofy and w is 
a component of z. 
'Component of'is left unspecified deliberately. Clearly if y is a spatial part of 
x then y is a component of x under some decomposition. Similarly a soldier 
may be a component of a n  army but it is not obviotls that a soldier is a spatial 
part of an army. Using Df I I we may say that Reid attributed the following 
doctrine t o  Leibniz: 
P4 For any entity x, if x is composite then there is a decomposition 
D of x such that, for any y,  if y E D then y is not composite. 
I am convinced that Leibniz accepted P4. P4 seems to capture the force of 
paragraph 2 of the Monad01og.y. But I a m  not convinced thet P4captures the 
force of our other passages. In particular, I think it involves an underestima- 
tion of the subtlety of Leibniz's thought to  suppose that by "true unity" he 
meant a non-composite entity. Indeed in a letter of October 9, 1687, to  
Arnauld we find Leibniz saying this: 
Thus parts are able to constitute a whole, whether it has or  whether ~t does not havea true 
unity. It IS true that the whole which has a true unlty is able to remain the same individual 
rigorously although it gains or loses parts, as we experience in ourselves.'" (GI21 120: 
Mason, 153) 
My suggestion is that Leibniz's conception of a true unity may be put as 
follows: x i s  a true unity just in case the unity of x a t  a timeand the identity of 
x over time is not a matter of convention (cf. G / 2 /  100-101; Mason, 126-127). 
On Leibniz's view there are entities with a unity shy o f a  true unity-"I do not 
say that there is nothing substantial . . . in things devoid of a true unity.  . ." 
(G/2/97; M 122). Consider, then, the following doctrine: 
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P5 For any entity x, if x is composite then there is a decomposi- 
tion D of x such that, for any y ,  if y E D then y is a true unity. 
Now given my parsing of "true unity," P5 amounts to this: 
P6 For any entity x, if x is composite then there is a decomposi- 
tion D of x such that, for any y, i f y  E D then the unity ofy a t  a 
given time and the identity of y over time is not a matter of 
convention. 
I suggest that P6 captures a doctrine that is common to our quotations, 
excluding the one from the Monaciology which is captured by P4. 
Since the notion of a decomposition occurs in P4 through P6, we may say 
that the notion of a component occurs implicitly in P4through P6. We obtain 
much of the force that Leibniz intended for P4 through P6 if we construe 'is a 
component of' as something Iike 'is a n  element in a logical construction of' 
("Substantial unities are not parts but foundations ofphenomenaW[G/2/268; 
Loemker, (874/536)]). If we accept my suggestion that Aristotelian substances 
which are not true unities (i.e., those whoseidentity conditions a rea  matter of 
convention) were treated by Leibniz as  logical constructions, then P5 and P6 
may appear to be the result of the application of a "Fundierung Axiom" for 
logical constructions. Perhaps a composite entity which is a logical construc- 
tion is constructed out of entities which are themselves logical constructions, 
but this chain must begin with entities which arenot logical constructions. So 
construed, P5 has considerable plausibility and is not the brute assertion: if 
there are compounds there must be simples. 
I believe that the same texts that support the ascription of P5 to Leibniz and 
that support the parsing of P5 in terms of P6also go some way toward making 
clear how Leibniz intended to  argue from P5 to  P4. I take the strategy t o  be 
this: Leibniz assumed that we would agree that in the cases of flocks, armies, 
colleges, and the like it is plainly a matter of convention as to  what constitutes 
a flock, an army, etc., at a given time; hence, he assumed that the unity of such 
entities is a matter of convention (G/2/76; Mason, 94-95; G/2/97; Mason, 
121-122; G / 2 /  100-101; Mason, 125-127), He thought it even more obvious 
that the conditions governing the identity over time of such entities are a 
matter of convention (G/2/53-54; Mason, 60; G/4/436; DM, sec. 12). More- 
over Leibniz assumed that it is frequently a matter of degree whether a given 
composite satisfies the conventions for constituting, e.g., a flock (G/2/96; 
Mason, 121; G/2 /  100; Mason, 126). These same passages suggest that 
Leibniz regarded such entities as logical constructions; these entities "that are 
useful only for summarizing our thoughts and representing phenomena" 
(G/2/96; Mason, 121). 
Consider the case of a flock of sheep. Leibniz claimed that when certain 
relations hold among certain entities, i.e,, sheep, whose unity is not in the 
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same way a matter of convention, then we refer to a (single) flock. A flock, 
then, is a logical construction out of its components. But, Leibniz argued, our 
judgments about what constitutes a (single) material object, i.e., about what 
constitutes the unity of material objects-are similarly based on convention 
with the composite material object playing a role similar to that of a flock of 
sheep and parts of the material object (under some decomposition) playing a 
role similar to  that of the sheep in the flock. In fact, according to Leibniz, the 
kind of relations upon which judgments of unity are based are the same in 
widely divergent cases, e.g., "contiguity, common movement, concurrence 
towards one and the same end" (G/2/96; Mason, 121). But, Leibniz argued, 
the problem of the unity of material objects has a complication lacking in the 
case of flocks; for the problem of the unity of the parts of material objects is 
in the same way a matter of convention-indeed, it is obviously thevery same 
problem. 
Now each extended mass can be considered as composed of two or a thousand others; 
there exists only extension ach~eved through contiguity . . . the parts making it up are 
subject to the same difficulty . . . one never arrives at  any real entity, because entities made 
up by aggregation have only as much reality as ex~s ts  in their constituent parts. From this 
it follows that the substance of a body, if bodies have one, must be ~nd~visible. (G/2/72; 
Mason, 88) 
From these considerations Leibniz concluded: 
If body is a substance . . . one must necessarily conceive of someth~ng there that one calls 
substantial form, and which corresponds in a way to the soul (G/2/58; Mason, 66; cf. 
G/2/72, Mason, 88; (312196; Mason, 121) 
Note that these passages seem to  support the following principle (at any rate, 
when applied to material objects): 
P7 For any entity J, if x is composite then there is a decomposi- 
tion D of x such that, for some y, y c D a n d y  is not composite. 
P7 suggests this picture: for a given material object x we consider a decom- 
position D of x whose elements are various proper (spatial) parts of x plus a 
monad y. x, then, is constructed in terms of various "unity-makingWrelations 
holding among y and the spatial parts in D. But this half-way house position 
will not stand and Leibniz knew it. After a11 each spatial part that is an  element 
of D must have its own unity, i.e., must be a spatial part of x. With respect to 
each such part the same problems arise as arose with respect to  the original 
composite x. The reasons that led Leibniz to P7 were bound to  lead him to P4. 
And that is all there is to  it? Hardly. I am aware that the account rendered 
above is incomplete. Among other things there is need for detailed considera- 
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tion of Leibniz's views concerning the conditions under which a judgment is 
LLa matter of convention." Moreover, what I said above, if accurate a t  all, 
outlines but one line of reasoning which led Leibniz to the doctrine of the 
simplicity of substance. There is no mention here of "the labyrinth of the 
continuum,"for example. Furthermore, the account outlined here points to a 
number of problems that need resolution. Here is one: I suggested that 
Leibniz argued that if x is composite then x is not a substance and if x has 
spatial parts then x is composite, so  if x has spatial parts then x is not a 
substance. What about temporal parts? Leibniz saw the problem: 
But if it is claimed that substances d o  not remain the same but that different substances 
wh~ch follow upon prior ones are always produced by God, this would be a quarrel about 
a word, for there is no further princ~ple in thtngs by which such a controversy can be 
dec~ded (G/2/264; Loemker, [871-215351) 
So in his most lucid moments Leibniz held that no object enduring through 
time is a substance? No. In the same passage where Leibniz posed the problem 
he hinted a t  a solution: 
The fact that a certaln law perslsts which ~nvolves all of the future states of that which we 
conceive to be the same-this is the very fact, I say, that constitutes the same substance. 
(Ibld.) 
A careful statement of the problem as Leibniz saw it and his purported 
solution would provide a giant stride forward in understanding the details of 
Leibniz's conception of substance. 
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